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Abstract 
This paper seeks to explore the methods of intervention the Nigerian Government has 
chosen to take, in order to deal with the militant Islamic group, Boko Haram, and why 
these methods have failed the military. Due to the complex build-up of the Nigerian 
political system, this project concentrates chiefly on the military branch of the 
Government. 
The extremist terror organisation, Boko Haram, was formed in 2002 in the 
Northeastern state of Nigeria, Borno. Massacres, terrorist attacks and large-scale child 
abductions are merely three examples to illustrate the brutal way in which the rebel group 
operates. By looking at the origins of Boko Haram and the structure of the Nigerian 
Government, we are in a position to explain the reasons for why the Nigerian military has 
been so unsuccessful in dealing with the problem at hand. Additionally, we consider the 
goals and motivations driving Boko Haram’s insurgency, as well as assessing the internal 
political decision-making in Nigeria, seeing as this will help us better understand what the 
most effective method of countering them is.  
This paper is based primarily on a qualitative research approach. To answer our 
research question, we have analysed the indicators; leadership, strategies, budget, equipment, 
and aid. In addition to this, in order to analyse these indicators, we have used the concepts 
of Political interference and Foreign aid, with the help of the theories, The Political Theory of 
Foreign Aid and The Leading Change Model.  
We find our problem area of examining the military’s failure in dealing with Boko 
Haram to be of particular relevance to everyday life in Africa, and as a result, are 
interested in discovering the reasons preventing the terror group for continuing its ravage. 
Seeing as the battle between Boko Haram and the Nigerian military has been going on for 
more than 10 years, it seems remarkable that Africa’s richest nation has been unable to 
find an appropriate solution to the problem. In addition to this, this piece of writing not 
only recognises the strength the radical Muslim sect possesses, but also reveals how it is in 
fact growing in strength.  
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The findings of this project affirm that the foremost reasons responsible for the 
military’s failure are a lack of suitable weapons and as well as a non-functioning 
leadership. We draw this conclusion on the basis of our analysis of indicators.  
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 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Project Motivation 
Our chosen topic of this semester is based on an interest in multiculturalism. Our area of 
research takes inspiration from the general topic ‘War and terrorism’, and has emerged 
from current events happening around the Africa. The interest of basing the research 
project on war and terrorism occurred as a result of prior knowledge on Africa and its 
current national situation. The objectives of this project stem our concerns about Nigerian 
citizens. The awareness of how the Boko Haram insurgency is being encountered in 
northern Nigeria, has brought to question whether the Nigerian Government is using its 
full supremacy and strength to ensure a peaceful and democratic environment for its 
citizens. 
Additionally, worldwide media and scholars’ findings have long been questioning 
why the Nigerian Government has not yet been able to defeat Boko Haram. Due to the 
facts given by international articles and security councillors, it has brought us to question 
whether the Nigerian Military is mentally and physically well equipped to encounter the 
threat. As well as this, our prior knowledge about the Nigerian Military and Boko Haram, 
has led us to assume that the Nigerian Military is lacking recourses. Nigeria has 
throughout the fight with Boko Haram rejected foreign aid, which has resulted in many 
fatalities amongst the military forces. These facts combined allow us to make the 
assumption that the Nigerian Military has been unsuccessful in combating Boko Haram. 
We are aware of the fact that our Research Question can be perceived as being 
somewhat presumptuous. However, by incorporating both political and military 
perspectives on the issue, we can create a unique contribution to the pre-existing 
literature. 
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 1.2 Outline of project 
The following paragraph will give a brief overview of the structure of our project, with the 
purpose of ensuring that the reader is aware from the start, what this piece of writing is 
going to include. 
Firstly, this project starts out with an introduction, wherein a description of the 
terrorist group Boko Haram and an outline of the project’s main aim, is given. An 
additional background section is included to ensure the reader understands the context in 
which our problem area is based. Besides this, the origins and ideology of Boko Haram are 
elaborated upon, where we also touch upon some of the events the group is infamous for. 
Naturally, the project’s problem area follows on from here. The problem area starts 
out with a definition of relevant key concepts, before moving on to explaining the purpose 
of this project. It is here, where our research and sub-questions are introduced.  
Thirdly, the theory chapter introduces, a model and a theory; namely, the Leading 
Change Model and The Political Theory of Foreign Aid. This 8 step model is outlined in a 
rather general sense, and an explanation of how this model will be used in order to answer 
our research question, is offered. The chapter will also introduce the Political theory of 
Foreign Aid. The chapter will firstly introduce a concept, whereby indicators are found. 
We will then apply these indicators to our theory, which focuses on how foreign aid can 
affect the Nigerian military in regards to political interference. 
In short, by choosing two different theories, we can be sure that we will be able to answer 
both of our sub-questions appropriately. 
Our analysis chapter is broken up into the answering of our two separate sub-
questions, whereby relevant information is gathered, evaluated and in turn, interpreted. 
Our analysis is based on the first three chapters of our project; our methods and theories 
are inextricably linked to the answering of our research question. 
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1. 3 Introduction 
This project will examine the reasons behind the lack of interference from the Nigerian 
military in the combatting of the insurgent group, Boko Haram. This forms the crux of our 
argument and is articulated succinctly through our research question. Moreover, our 
choice of sub questions demonstrates the standpoint we have taken in relation to our 
problem area. The two factors this paper seeks to investigate, which we maintain to be 
instrumental in the lack of governmental interference, are political corruption and the lack 
of military equipment. 
In addition to this, we seek to explore the methods of intervention the Nigerian 
Government has already chosen to take, in order to deal with the militant Islamic group, 
Boko Haram. It would seem the military’s efforts have been in vain, up until now. As 
previously mentioned, this piece of writing will focus primarily on the Nigerian military, 
as opposed to the Government; nevertheless, both parties will be incorporated, seeing as 
both are relevant in relation to our problem area.  
Boko Haram, often described as an extremist terrorist organisation, was formed in 
2002 in the Northeastern state of Nigeria, Borno. The group is infamous for its group 
kidnappings and terror attack. By examining both the origins of Boko Haram and the 
structure of the Nigerian Government, we will be in a position to explain the reasons for 
why the Nigerian Government has been so ineffective in confronting the problem at hand. 
Additionally, we will consider the goals and motivations driving Boko Haram’s 
insurgency, seeing as this will help us better understand what the most effective method 
of countering them is. 
The escalating military actions between the Nigerian Government and Boko Haram 
in Northern Nigeria have resulted in several outbreaks of violence and insurgency. The 
tumultuous situation, which has been driven by Islamic extremism, has led to a need for 
international intervention. Former president Goodluck Jonathan stated, “if violent 
extremism is not contained in Nigeria, definitely it will spill into other countries in West 
Africa […] This is one of the reasons we have to move fast” (Maylie 2013:1).  
The growing occurrences of mass killings and kidnappings by Boko Haram have 
questioned the levels of peace and safety in Nigerian society. Innocent Nigerians civilians 
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are being forced to be a part of this unprecedented state of havoc and destruction. The 
insurgent group has made attempts to enforce the practice of Sharia Law on the multi-
religious nation, suggesting this is one of the group's principal motives. 
Boko Haram’s rebels are well equipped and fearless, often outnumbering the 
military’s troops who have been sent on patrol. Especially in the Northern states of 
Nigeria, this has taken a great toll on the lives of the Nigerian locals. Among other noble 
Nigerians, Wole Soyanika stated that Nigeria has lost most control over the majority of the 
territory, and as a result should be referred to as a failed state (Howden 2010). Due to the 
institutionalised corruption in Nigerian society, as well as the ever-growing rate at which 
criminal activity grows, the state is no longer able to provide decent public services. The 
lack of a real authority, mostly in Northern Nigeria and central regions, shows the lack of 
control from the federal Government. 
According to Akande (2013), the Government has deployed between 7.500-8.000 
troops in an attempt to combat the terror group’s insurgents. Despite this, as a result of the 
absence of both the Military Code of Justice (military law), as well as the ability to 
appropriately defend civilians, Boko Haram’s reign of terror is yet to be halted.  
Furthermore, the lack of a clear military program for dealing with the insurgency is 
evident. It would seem apparent that there are a great number of key causal factors at 
play, when looking at the lack of interference from the Nigerian Government. Factors such 
as corruption, the structure of the state, civil disobedience and a lack of resources, have 
provoked much discussion amongst modern-day scholars. It is vital to remember that the 
matter at hand is a political one, due to the internal fight for national power in Nigeria. 
Scholars, background research and investigations have been able to empirically link 
several of these causal factors to both the increased violence in Nigeria and also 
Government’s methods of interference. 
In brief, the following piece of literature will investigate the contextual dynamics 
and factors that are most prominent in explaining the military’s failure to tackle the 
presence of Boko Haram.  
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1.4 Problem Area 
Nigeria became independent in the year 1960 in the aftermath of World War II, though, 
despite this, 13 years of military rule from 1966-1979 followed (Adepoju 1981). In 1999, the 
country successfully formed a civilian Government and with this step, a hope for a 
peaceful shift became reality (The World Factbook 2015). Even though the Government’s 
elections, up until this day, are often spoiled by violence and corruption, Nigeria has 
enjoyed its longest period of freely and independent elections so far (The World Factbook 
2015). The two dominating religions in Nigeria are Christianity and Islam (Sunni), 
however, there are in fact more than 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria, of which the most 
influential are, Hausa and the Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo (The World Factbook 2015). The 
most densely populated area of Muslims is found in the Northern states of the country, 
whereas the South is predominantly inhabited by Christians. 
Amongst the populations are underlying tensions, developed through time as the 
result of this clash in religions, as well as the economic standing of these two religious 
groups. The wealthiest part of the country is namely in the South, whereas Nigerian 
Muslims are, on the whole, somewhat poorer.  
Boko Haram has been compared to other international terrorist organisations, such 
as Al Qaeda and Islamic State (also known as Daesh). All three groups want to follow the 
rules of the Sharia Law as stated in the Quran; an unavoidable consequence of this is the 
lack of recognition of Governments and laws, seeing as Western mentality contradicts 
Sharia law. 
During the past 6 months alone, Boko Haram has massacred at least 2053 civilians 
in the Northern states of Nigeria in pursuance of its goal to create a state governed by 
Sharia law. In excess of over 90 diligently planned attacks have been carried out, 
unhindered by Nigeria’s military. We find our problem field to be particularly interesting, 
seeing as we will be investigating the power struggle between Boko Haram and the 
Nigerian Government; a somewhat understudied aspect of the problem. The main issue 
we hope to resolve is why the Nigerian Government seems to have been unsuccessful in 
intervening in this conflict, seeing as it has both the money and manpower to protect its 
173 million citizens (World Bank 2015). 
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In particular, this project will investigate how the Nigerian Government is currently 
dealing with the threat the group poses, as well as why its strategies of defence have 
failed. Our analysis will focus more specifically on the effect this lack of resources has on 
the military’s capabilities. We assume this to be a major explanatory-factor in why 
Nigeria’s military performances are so weak. With regards to the military, the indicators 
we have chosen to study, in order to be able to answer our research question, are aid, 
leadership, strategies, budgets and equipment.  
Often in situations, whereby civilians are slaughtered on a daily basis and cities are 
bombed regularly, international organisations interfere, in the hope of becoming a part of 
the solution. We will be emphasising both international aid and governmental 
intervention.  
The Government’s rejection of foreign aid from several official organisations allows 
this project to investigate the outcomes of this decision-making, as well as looking at the 
military’s lack of success in regards to eradicating Boko Haram. Similarly, this has led this 
project to consider both how and why external and internal interference can affect a 
military’s strategic procedure, when acting against a terrorist group. By investigating the 
diversity in terms of an organisation being equipped, this project will question whether 
the Nigerian military is well armed.   
Both our research question and according sub-questions embody the essence of 
these study goals.  
 
1.5 Research Question:  
Our problem field has led us to come up with the following research question: 
 
‘Why has the Nigerian Military been unsuccessful in combating Boko Haram?’  
 
By answering our two sub-questions, we can be certain that we will have covered 
the most important aspects of our research question. 
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1.6 Sub-questions: 
1.   How has political interference affected Nigeria’s military defence in combatting 
Boko Haram? 
2.   To what extent is the Nigerian military equipped to combat Boko Haram? 
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 2. Methods 
The following chapter will provide an in-depth outline of our chosen methods and 
research approach, as well giving an explanation of how these methods will be 
incorporated into our analysis.  
 
2.1 Choice of methods 
Our choice of methods is an overall research strategy. It encompasses both the process of 
how we aim to conduct our study, as well as the actual focus of our investigation. The 
following section of writing will explain how and which methods we have chosen to use, 
in order to best answer our research question.  
 
Methods can be either quantitative or qualitative in nature, but the choice of 
methods is wholly dependent upon the respective problem area. Besides this, it is also 
possible to carry out an investigation by using a mixed method approach.  Our project will 
attempt to give a full qualitative investigation of Nigeria’s failure to eliminate Boko 
Haram. 
Quantitative methods differ from qualitative methods in relation to their research 
strategy (Bryman 2012:35). The research strategy that represents quantitative methods is 
identified by conducting data and analysing it. It could also be described as the approach 
in which we can use the results in measurements (Bryman 2012). On the contrary, a 
qualitative methods approach is based on literature, rather than measurements and 
statistical information. It is the words written, analysis done and the way information is 
interpreted that creates the foundations of a project/theory (Bryman 2012). This choice of 
methods focuses on testing our assumption by using written data to formulate arguments. 
An important factor of qualitative research is the opinions represented in the data used in 
the project; this could also be explained as the different interpretations of situations 
present in the used data (Hesse-Biber 2011). 
We will be using a qualitative research approach, whereby the majority of the 
information we gather will be in the form of written data. This approach allows us to test 
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both our assumptions, as well as our chosen theories, in order to evaluate their usefulness 
in answering our Research Question. Furthermore, the difficulty regarding accessing 
official data in Nigeria is preventing us from gathering useful quantitative and also 
qualitative information. The difficulties we have faced regarding finding appropriate 
sources for the project, will be explained further in our Delimitations sub-chapter.  
By using qualitative methods, we have chosen to take an inductive approach in 
order to find answers to our hypothesis regarding the lack of military interference.  This 
will be further explained in our Research approach sub-chapter. 
Our preparation phase will begin by selecting relevant data that links in with the 
Nigerian Government and Boko Haram. By singling out certain pieces of data for in-depth 
analysis, both about the Government and Boko Haram, we will be in a position to evaluate 
which pieces are most useful in the answering of our research question. The examining of 
irrelevant information may lead to us drawing a factually incorrect conclusion.  
The strength of our approach can be qualified as data that is easy to obtain. Already 
written data is easily collected (books, internet, journals etc.) and can be compared. We are 
unfortunately not provided with the opportunity to do field work, nor carry out 
interviews locally in Nigeria, and therefore, have very little quantitative data to support 
our arguments. For this reason, we find the advantages of a qualitative research more 
useful. Yet, despite this, our chosen choice of method does not entirely exclude the use of 
quantitative data in our project. If we find usable statistics, measurements, comparative 
data etc. which we find to be advantageous in terms of offering an explanation, then we 
will, by all means, make use of them  (Hesse-Biber 2011). 
On the other hand, the weakness of using a quantitative approach exclusively, is 
that influential factors, such as communities, status, perceptions and most importantly 
beliefs, cannot simply be reduced to a specific number; their strength lies in their ability to 
be interpreted. Effective and reliable data requires a large amount of research. 
Nonetheless, in many cases e.g. Governments and nongovernmental parties or 
organisation lack the appropriate skills and resources to be able to carry out a quantitative 
research. Additionally, such data denies us the opportunity to provide an argumentation 
 Roskilde University  
 The Bachelor Study Programme in Social Science 
 Project report | 2nd semester | BP 2 
page 15 / 66 
for our sub-questions, since the data is neither precise nor-in depth. Thus, we are 
excluding the possibility of using this approach (Hesse-Biber 2011). 
 
2.2 Research approach 
Our research approach for examining governmental interference is based on testing our 
assumptions; that is, the reasons we maintain to be instrumental in the military’s 
unsuccessful removal of the enemy. This will be done by analysing both what the Nigerian 
Government has done so far to tackle the national crises, as well as what it is intending to 
do. By gathering information on the Government and its approach to the crisis at hand, it 
will help us verify or falsify our initial assumptions. 
It is important to draw our attention towards, not only the type of sources our 
project uses, or the type of methods that will be applied, but also, the research approach of 
the project and how the evidence and results are going to be presented. 
There are two ways of using research approaches and these two forms are; 
inductive or deductive. An inductive approach means that a theory or hypothesis is being 
generated or developed. This is typically done through own gathered information of 
published data in books, journal articles etc. For the most part, the data is based on 
interpretations born from the used data (Hesse-Biber 2011). The process of an inductive 
approach starts with observations and broad research, which ends with a concrete 
formulated theory or hypothesis (Bryman 2007). On the other hand, deductive approaches 
are only used if the purpose of the study is to test a certain theory; any final conclusion is 
drawn through logical arguments (Bryman 2007). The testing of the theory is done via 
measurements, statistics and variables. Based on the descriptions presented, it is clear that 
an inductive approach bodes better for this project; our conclusions will be built upon 
information we gather from published literature. Our theories will also be actively 
involved in the forming of a conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
 Roskilde University  
 The Bachelor Study Programme in Social Science 
 Project report | 2nd semester | BP 2 
page 16 / 66 
2.3 Methodology 
In order to answer our research question, it is first of all, important to familiarise ourselves 
with the literature we are using for our project. The literature provides us with a core 
understanding of our topic, helping us to establish a sound argument for our project. 
Seeing as the reign of Boko Haram in Nigeria is such a multifaceted topic, it is important 
to choose one of the key aspects from the literature to base our argument on. 
The research we have conducted so far has led us to the issue of corruption in, not 
only the Nigerian Government, but the whole political arena in Nigeria. Since corruption 
seems to be the one common denominator for terrorism and uproar in Nigeria, we 
perceive it to be one of our ultimate causes for the military’s lack of interference. 
Nevertheless, our proximate causes, such as; lack of military equipment, denying 
international aid, lack of proper military training etc. can be helpful in understanding the 
ultimate cause.  
Our analysis will cover specifically the proximate causes in our problem area, yet, 
these will be looked upon in the light of our ultimate cause, corruption. This unique way 
of investigating our topic is one of this project’s contributions to modern-day literature. It 
is important to note that the ultimate cause, corruption, is not our central argument, for 
answering our Research Question, but rather a plausible reasoning for the military’s 
failure. 
When answering our sub-questions, it is important not to view them as two 
different questions. The sub-questions will act as a guide for the coming analysis chapters, 
whereby we will take the stance that the military is too inexperienced and under-equipped 
to be able to successfully rid Nigeria of Boko Haram.  
In order to fully answer our research question, all aspects of the sub-questions must 
be covered through the use of appropriate theories.  
 
2.4 Delimitation 
The greatest limitation we have come across in this process has been the problem of both 
accessing certain sources, as well as the validity of them. Our initial idea was to gather our 
information from official documents, and webpages from the Nigerian Government, 
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seeing as most nations have a duty to make the majority of their data public. However, 
this proved to be much more challenging than we had initially anticipated. Many of the 
web pages and official documents we attempted to access, were either not functioning 
properly, or our access denied. This was still the case, even after changing the computer's 
IP-address to a Nigerian IP-address, in an attempt to get around this problem. 
Due to the difficulties of using Nigerian sources, much of our research descended 
from news articles in place of official documents. Though this might have created some 
problems in regards to source validity, this was the best option, if we were to gather 
information that was both up to date and factually relevant.  
When making the decision of using news articles as a valid source, a decision was 
also taken in regards to what kind of news articles would be acceptable. It was important 
to try and make the scope of political demeanour as wide as possible, without including 
tabloids or other such magazines.  
2.5 Implementation  
We aim to build a research project by combining two different perspectives, in an 
effort to develop a sound conclusion. The subdivision of the research question is divided 
in two sub-questions: a political insight into how the military is combatting Boko Haram, 
and how the process is affected by political interference: secondly, an insight into how a 
lack of resources and equipment has caused the military to be disadvantaged in the fight 
against Boko Haram. 
We aim to implement the Political Theory of Foreign Aid to analyse the first sub-
question. In the process of analysing the sub-question, we will assess the theory by first 
defining the concept “political interference” and finding the most important indicator. 
This has led our research to use ‘aid’ as the most influential factor (indicator) of the 
concept. The Political Theory of Foreign Aid is used to investigate the fundamental 
purpose of why foreign aid is provided. By having a full understanding the reasons as to 
why aid is given, this will give the research project an insight into why aid from, inter alia, 
UN and AU is given to the Nigerian Government and how it (aid) is affecting the military 
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in fighting the terrorist group. This will then give us access to analysing how the military 
is affected by political interference in terms of combatting Boko Haram. 
 
Additionally, we will be using the ‘Leading Change Model’ to help us measure our 
indicators: leadership, strategy, budget and resources, in regards to the Nigerian military. 
Whilst analysing the indicators of the military, the Leading Change Model can be useful as 
it gives an insight into determining whether the indicators are working properly. As the 
Leading Change Model suggests, a coalition should consist of 4 key elements in order to 
be perceived as reliable, and as we know what these key elements are, it will be possible to 
determine whether the military management is functioning well. This is an example of 
how the Leading Change Model can be used in determining whether or not the chosen 
indicators are functioning properly, or whether change should be implemented into the 
management. 
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 3. Theoretical Framework 
The following chapter will examine our choice of theories and concepts, as well as offering 
an explanation of how we find their application to this project to be relevant. In brief, the 
concepts political interference and foreign aid are defined, where after we introduce one of 
our chosen theories; namely, the Leading Change model. 
 
3.1 Concept 
According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia (2011), the definition of concepts is defined as 
small parts of thoughts. It is a process, which categorises a variety of ideas and can be 
applied as a theoretical approach. In this project, we aim to lead our theoretical 
investigation from a concept to a theory. Meaning that we have chosen to start our 
theoretical approach by defining the concept Political Interference and identifying its 
indicators. This had led the research to a theory that conducts an investigation in how to 
understand our specific indicator and how it will affect our hypothesis. 
 
3.1.1 Political Interference 
Seeing as it is difficult to define the concept “political interference,” as a result of 
the many different ways in which it can be interpreted, dependent upon the perspective 
one takes, it is important that we outline how we are planning to understand the concept. 
Our analysis recognises political interference as an attempt to gain regional advantages. It 
is responsible for offering and suggesting the best judgment on how to protect its nation. 
Political interference occurs in different segments, such as poverty, education, 
employment, economy, health or military preparedness. According to a variety of scholars 
and research, the above mentioned can be understood as political indicators, which 
describe the motivation behind a certain political interference. However, in attempt to 
fully understand the concept, a clear and specific definition of the concept “political 
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interference” has not yet been offered among scholars and researchers, which noticeably 
has negatively affected the research project (Council on Foreign Relations 1967). 
The concept has been implied in governmental interference. It is an instrument 
based on foreign policy for, inter alia, war, negotiations and diplomatic pressure. The 
interference of a certain state or a nation is based on its own interest and protection. The 
practice of a state’s interference can serve a national and governmental political purpose. 
In order for ideal conditions for a country’s survival to exist, it is believed that external 
help can raise a country status in economic, political and social matter (Council on Foreign 
Relations 1967). These specific actions that are based on a governmental act can be 
identified as indicators. Socio-economics and socio-politics objectives can be categorised as 
indicators for political interference (Sana n.d.). These can be motivated by concerns about 
income-equality, as well as a desire to provide basic services to all the nation’s citizens. 
Moreover, interference in politics can be the link between a nation and the outside world. 
The commutation between the domestic and international community can be depending 
on political interference. Interference can serve peace and cooperation between 
countries.  Additionally, having a state interfering with another state, can both result in a 
positive or a negative outcome (Council on Foreign Relations 1967: McGillivray n.d). Yet, 
how can political interference affect the country and which indicators can play a role in the 
act? 
Economic and political interference can have a certain effect on the state/country, 
however, by combining both terms of interferences, it has shown that foreign aid can be a 
crucial indicator in the process. 
To assess our assumption of how political interference is affecting the Nigerian 
military in combating Boko Haram, it is relevant to look upon how foreign aid, as the 
essential indicator of political interference, can affect the military. By implementing the 
Political theory of Foreign Aid, it will benefit our analysis and test our assumptions.  
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Due to the broad definition of the concept, we have chosen to contribute to 
literature by dividing the concept into smaller pieces (indicators) to clarify how we 
understand it and how we will apply it to our research project. 
3.1.2 Foreign Aid 
The concept of Foreign Aid puts forward a variety of different explanations and 
interpretations. Literature and empirical data has determined that foreign aid is a political 
process, which is based on participants pursuing their self-interest through any actual 
economic procedure. Any transfer of goods, money or services to a recipient from a 
specific donor can be classified as an instrument of a both a political and economic policy 
(McGillivray n.d.). The relation between a foreign country and its interest in giving any 
kind of advices or services without any repayments to another country, can be qualified as 
foreign aid. 
3.2 The Political Theory of Foreign Aid 
Hans J. Morgenthau, an American political scientist, stresses the importance of the 
recognition of the diversity of the term Foreign Aid (Morgenthau 2004). Morgenthau 
(1962) distinguishes the term and divides it into six categories: namely, subsistence foreign 
aid, humanitarian foreign aid, bribery prestige foreign aid, foreign aid for economic 
development and military aid. 
The political theory of Foreign Aid can be further sub-categorised into four stages. 
Seeing as aid is an assistance that is provided to different organisations, unions or 
countries, it is also the reasons for reading why the specific reasons for needing this can 
vary. These can be divided into: political, strategic, economic or moral values (Sana n.d.). 
Foreign aid in a political matter influences regime to promote approachable 
relations. It can be seen as a tool to reward regimes and create a balanced communication. 
The second reason for the provision of foreign aid is to grant both economic and 
military support to fulfil the receiver’s policy goals. If a nation is threatened from an 
 Roskilde University  
 The Bachelor Study Programme in Social Science 
 Project report | 2nd semester | BP 2 
page 22 / 66 
international enemy, the donor will support the military’s capabilities to combat the 
enemy. The third reason for why a state provides foreign aid is based on economic 
development. It increases the living standards of the receiving state and can also benefit 
the donor state. Moral Values can also be an influential factor in the process of foreign aid. 
According to the theory, moral values provide justification. Countries have the obligation 
to support and assist other countries with recourses in a critical situation. 
The above mentioned are all indicators for political interference in regards to aid. 
However, in this project we aim to use the definition of military aid to support and answer 
our first sub question. Morgenthau’s (1962) discussion of how to define military aid is 
based on decades of historical events, where aid was the primary role and became the 
most important solution. Morgenthau (1962) stresses the idea and the purpose of foreign 
aid, and how to understand it. Military aid is the foundation of buttressing unions and 
alliances (McGillivray n.d.). The theory can be understood as a “division of labor between 
two allies who pool their resources, one supplying money, material and training, the other 
providing primarily manpower” (McGillivray n.d.: 303). The recipients are depending on 
the donor’s resources and financial help to create the most effective military force. Despite 
this, they cannot operate nor take any decisions without the provision of necessary 
training and support of the donor. 
The political theory of foreign aid addresses the main importance of, how external 
help and provision can be influential in political interference. The theory will be used to 
shed light on how the provided help from both internal and external communities can 
affect the Nigerian Military to combat Boko Haram.  
3.3 Leading Change Model 
In the case of the Nigerian military’s lack of success in combatting Boko Haram, this 8-step 
program (described below) cannot only be used as a possible solution for a new strategy, 
but also as a tool to analyse the lack of involvement expressed by the Nigeria’s military. 
When researching current methods of military interference, these steps should all be 
considered, regardless of whether they are implemented or not. The steps should be 
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followed systematically, and where application of the steps occurs, it is vital to assess 
whether or not the previous and/ or later steps are also followed, or, at least, are intended 
to be followed. 
The model was first introduced in 1996 by John P. Kotter for businesses to 
transform themselves, but was later brought into the field of social science. This eight step 
program is thus not exclusively for businesses, and allows us to apply it to other societal 
structures such as the Government and the military. The eight steps of the model are 
explained step-by-step below later on. 
 
The steps for the program are: 
 
1.      Establish a sense of urgency 
2.      Form a powerful guiding coalition 
3.      Create a vision 
4.      Communicate the vision 
5.      Empower others to act on the vision 
6.      Plan for and create short-term wins 
7.      Consolidate improvements and produce still more change 
8.      Institutionalize the new approaches 
(Watters 2011:28-29) 
 
The first step, establishing a sense of urgency, is described as the most important 
step by Kotter himself (Applebaum et. al. 2012). This step involves getting leaders or 
management to understand that the current strategy is not functioning properly. This is 
achieved by analysing the market position of the business or, in this case, the management 
of the military. When constructing an argument for a change of current methods, it is 
important to make management understand the importance of this change, otherwise the 
likelihood of it being implemented is low (Applebaum et. al. 2012). 
The second step is only applied after the sense of urgency has been established, and 
change is now expected to happen. This step creates a coalition that should contain 4 key 
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elements; namely, position power, expertise, credibility and leadership (Applebaum et. al. 
2012; Kotter 1996). The 4 elements ensure that the coalition is strong (position power) 
enough, so as to not be be overruled by outside opposition: the decision making process 
(expertise) has been through all possible outcomes: the coalition is respected (credibility) 
as to ensure that forces employing the change(s) believe in them: and lastly leadership to 
drive the coalition into making changes (Applebaum et. al. 2012). 
Step three and four both try to perceive what the future will look like. These steps 
are all about creating a vision for the future, and how to make people believe in that 
vision. The coalition is in charge of making these steps happen (Applebaum et. al. 2012). 
Creating a clear vision is an important step, as the actors of the vision are more prone to 
believe in it if the believed end-result is an improvement of the current state (Applebaum 
et. al 2012). The clear vision also creates a better base for communicating the vision, 
though this does not mean that the communication of the vision should be one-way; 
rather, quite the opposite (Kotter 1996:90). Establishing a two-way communication, would 
be a better solution, as it will create a feeling of involvement for the employers who have 
to act out the vision (Kotter 1996: 90). 
After the vision has been established, it is now time to implement it. This is where 
management needs to make its employees act out the vision. This step is best acted out by 
training the employees, as training provides the employees with a sense of responsibility 
and empowerment (Kotter 1996:107-109). 
The sixth step of the program is to create short-term wins. This step is once again 
very important, as it provides the actors of the vision, with a sense of accomplishment. 
Implementing the vision might be demanding, and without the short-term wins, the 
vision can be seen as “all work, and no play”, which will make the actors lose faith in the 
vision (Applebaum et. al. 2012; Kotter 1996). 
Nevertheless, gaining wins does not mean that the vision has been carried out. This 
is important to realise, as believing this will lead to a risk in the stopping of working 
towards the final goal (Kotter 1996). Instead, analysing the changes already ensured can be 
used to further develop the vision, changing strategies where need be (Applebaum et. al. 
2012). 
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The final step of the program is to anchor new approaches in the corporate culture. This 
step implies that the previous 7 steps should now be known as the way management 
works. It is crucial that the new vision keep developing and improving, in order for it to 
continue to function optimally (Applebaum et. al. 2012). 
As mentioned earlier, though steps are originally thought out for a business, we find the 
model to be appropriate for analysing the Nigerian military and thus our interpretation of 
the 8 steps stems from a social science perspective. The model can help gain an 
understanding of how the military functions, and where there is room for  
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 4. Political Interference in the Nigerian Military 
 
It is important to note that despite the sub-questions being divided up into two chapters 
they both will help us develop our argument, answer our research question and derive to 
a conclusion. 
The first sub-question seeks to investigate the financial aid given to the military, 
which the Nigerian Government has accepted and rejected. The aid from USA and Britain, 
as well as the AU, will be examined with respect to how it has affected the Nigerian 
Government. 
4.1 Financial Aid  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the most significant and notable topic that is 
dominating the agenda of this year’s African Union Summit, is Boko Haram. The African 
Union’s ability and capacity to act towards the insurgencies caused by Boko Haram, is 
being put to the test. The most important decisions about how to tackle Boko Haram, 
which needed to be addressed at the summit after months of struggle and resistance by 
the international community, have meant that the Nigerian Government has agreed to a 
multilateral force. The AU has decided to provide both financial and military help, 
comprised of troops and training from Benin, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria (DW 
2015). 
However, the question about how the proposed forces can get the job done remains 
unanswered. Indeed leaders from participating countries have rejected the plan of having 
non-African troops involved in the combatting of Boko Haram, yet the African Union has 
decided to seek UN mandate to raise funds: "We are not asking for more troops, we want 
material and financial support for this operation […]” (DW 2015). This was a statement 
from Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chad’ Foreign Minister. Due to Nigeria’s extensive 
corruption, which has considerably weakened the military in combating Boko Haram, the 
African Union has set up a multilateral trust fund to assist Nigeria. 
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In view of the increasing impact that the African Union has had on the UN, several 
assistance program and findings have been provided to support Nigeria in the fight. In 
terms of provided aid, the Nigerian Government required both logistic and financial help 
to combat and prevent Boko Haram from causing more damage and insurgencies. Nigeria 
has so far not yet shown any effective actions in term of combatting Boko Haram because 
it is lacking resources both in a political and financial matter. Former president Goodluck 
Jonathan stated that any form of external help would provide the Nigerian Government 
an effective and fast destruction of the terrorist group. The U.S. has, as the next chapter 
will explain, both provided military training and resources and financial and political 
support (Hanrahan 2015). 
U.S. officials and the Obama Administration have after several meetings with the 
British and French counterparts stressed their support and provision for a regional 
strategy. The UN Security Council authorized support for approximately 7.000-10.000 
troops and 4 million dollars deployment. France’s contributions to the Nigerian Military 
are provision of logistical support and surveillance. Additionally, the US State Department 
will provide 40 million dollars worth of aid to combat Boko Haram (Blanchard 2015). 
The necessary attention for what counters terrorism and insurgencies is drawn 
further away from the Nigerian Government. Without any genuine cooperation between 
Nigeria and its neighbouring countries, the effort of combating the terror will be limited 
(Blanchard 2015). The cooperation between the regional and international communities 
will affect the Nigerian military. The provided financial help from both internal and 
external countries and programs will to assist the Nigerian military in combating Boko 
Haram. However, every decision and act the regional communities in Africa take, can and 
will have an impact on the strategy to defeat the group, consequently disturbing peace 
and democracy in the country (Blanchard 2015). 
4.2 Military aid from African Union 
Since the escalation of the situation, the Nigerian Government has both accepted and 
rejected various forms of help, both internal and external. Countries such as US, France 
and Britain have played an energetic role in providing aid to the Nigerian Government. 
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Nevertheless, the more predominant actor, namely The African Union (AU) has also 
provided some amount of help. 
Despite wanting aid, the Nigerian Government has been reluctant in accepting 
foreign help to combat Boko Haram, as the Government is worried that the sovereignty, 
national pride and political image of the country is at stake (Théroux-Bénoni 2015).        
However, in a meeting, held on the 29th of January, the AU decided to deploy 7500 
African Union troops in Nigeria according to the Multinational Joint Task Force, (MNJTF), 
(Théroux-Bénoni 2015). The UN secretary-general, Ban Ki Moon, supported the 
deployment of AU troops in Nigeria (The Guardian 2015). On the other hand, according to 
the Institute for Security Studies, the troops will not be deployed in Nigeria, but along 
Nigeria’s borders with its neighbouring countries, in an effort to contain the expansion of 
Boko Haram (Théroux-Bénoni 2015). According to some military and diplomatic sources, 
the MNJTF’s main task only accounts for 10-15% of the area, which is dominated by Boko 
Haram (Fessy 2015). Hence, the extent to which these 7500 troops will be of help to the 
Nigerian military is questionable. Nevertheless, the AU is now pursuing authorisation 
from the U.N. Security Council to establish an even stronger force (Blanchard 2015:11). 
4.3 International Military aid 
Nigeria attains US defence material through US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Direct 
Commercial Sales (DCS), and Excess Defence Articles (EDA) (Blanchard 2015:11). The 
Nigerian Government has also coordinated with the Department of Homeland Security, 
the Federal Aviation Administration, and the International Civil Aviation Organisation in 
order to fortify its security systems (Blanchard 2015:11). 
        As a result of the schoolgirls’ abduction, known as the “Chibok girls”, by Boko 
Haram, the Obama Administration arrayed an interagency team to consider opportunities 
to support Nigerian efforts in creating an attack strategy. Additionally, the US Department 
of Defence proposed advisors to help Nigerian forces and share information, obtained by 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets (Blanchard 2015:11). 
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On the other hand, Britain has also been providing military aid to Nigeria. In June 
2014, post-abduction of the schoolgirls, the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, 
increased its military aid to Nigeria to combat Boko Haram. The increased military aid 
focussed especially on extra training in counterinsurgency tactics (Gov.uk 2014). 
It can be argued that aid, especially from the AU and some external actors, can be 
beneficial to the Nigerian military; however, it requires that the aid is used in the most 
efficient manner. The US Department of Defence has evaluated the Nigerian military as 
“slow to adapt with new strategies, new doctrines and new tactics” (Blanchard 2015: 13). 
The Nigerian Government needs to change their tactics, procedures and techniques in 
order to successfully combat Boko Haram and this is also the primary aim of the 
Department of Defence (Blanchard 2015:13). According to a senior US intelligence official, 
the Nigerian military leadership is often focused on private gains, and has thus failed to 
equip and train its troops properly. He also believes that even if the Nigerian military 
were to be provided with a more modern weapons system, the troops would still lack the 
appropriate training and motivation (Blanchard 2015:13). 
4.4 Rejected Domestic Aid 
Perhaps one of the most prominent examples of the Nigerian Government blatantly 
refusing international help was in April 2014, when Boko Haram carried out a mass 
kidnapping of 300 secondary girls. Better known on the international front as the ‘Chibok 
girls’, this group of 16-18 year old adolescents was kidnapped at gunpoint, whilst in class 
at their local secondary school in Borno state (Keith 2014:7). Boko Haram has claimed 
complete responsibility for the abduction, stating that the girls will be sold off to its rebel 
members as brides (Keith 2014:7). There have been additional reports of the girls being 
used as sexual-object, with several of them being impregnated by Boko Haram’s 
militants.    
This one major event sparked a media firestorm, prompting other Nations, not only 
allies of Nigeria, to offer help in an effort to relocate the girls. Israel, the UK and the US 
were all prepared to offer immediate help in uncovering the whereabouts of the girls; both 
the UK and the US offered to send surveillance aircraft and ground troops (Bourne 
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2015:56). Nevertheless, it was not until 18 days after the crisis had broken out, that the 
country’s former president Goodluck Jonathan finally commented on the situation, in 
doing so, partially accepting the US and UK’s assistance in the form of surveillance 
technology. As well as these two countries, both China and France also ensured that 
Goodluck Jonathan was aware of their wish to actively participate in the search. However, 
it was not until a whole month after the initial kidnapping that he welcomed the help. 
(Bourne 2015:56). 
The fact that a minimum of 18 days passed, before Nigeria’s president found it 
necessary to comment on the matter, begs the question, why such a long delay? As a 
result, this led to international outrage against Nigeria’s leadership, with many claiming 
that the major lack of urgency expressed on the Government’s part has been one of the 
instrumental factors in the failure of detecting the girls (Faul 2014). According to And 
Abati, one of Jonathan's presidential advisers, information regarding this delayed 
response, had been created and leaked by the media; yet, it was false and had simply been 
misconstrued as a result of the media’s tendencies to sensationalise (Faul 2014). Though 
Nigeria’s military had seemingly taken the decision to accept the US’ offer of assistance 
immediately, it was unsuccessful in conveying this to the public. Abati’s somewhat 
ambiguous remarks may also point to our ultimate cause of corruption within the 
Nigerian Government. 
One of the foremost reasons for the Government’s delayed response to the US’ offer 
of help is due to an alleged lack of trust between the two nations (Keith 2014) Since the 
kidnapping, the majority of the help the Nigerian military has received in finding the 
Chibok girls has been provided by the United States. Finally, after a month of delays, the 
Nigerian Government accepted the US’s help in terms of drones and satellite information. 
Nevertheless, it would seem that the Government’s lack of urgency in responding to the 
US has led to an increase in mistrust, which consequently has made the military worse off. 
Shortly after, the US flew several drones in over the Northern states of Nigeria in the 
search for the Chibok girls (Keith 2014). Yet, after returning to base and collating the 
information, the US chose in fact to only give the Nigerian military a small proportion of 
the surveillance footage and ‘actionable intelligence’, that is, the data these drones 
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collected on their journey (Keith 2014). The US was suspicious of the military’s security 
services, as a result of its delayed response; US officials were wary that the security 
services and computer systems may have been infiltrated by Boko Haram militants and 
thus, by sharing all information with them, they would have been benefiting the enemy, 
rather than helping the ally. 
Additionally, Nigeria is known for being proud of having the largest military in 
Africa. As a result, it has always been cautious of its operations, ensuring any internal 
tasks, strategies and orders, which are to be carried out, remain undisclosed to non-
military folk (The Economist 2014:45). Many also claim that the Government is worried 
about the UK and the US encroaching in on its sovereignty and as a result has disallowed 
them from setting troops into the country. Though US forces have been permitted to scour 
the landscape for the girls by using drones, they have yet to be allowed onto Nigerian 
territory; since 2012 up until may 2014, the US had been working from a military base in 
the country’s neighbour land, Niger (The Economist 2014:46). 
In September 2013, the Nigerian Directorate of Training visited the U.S. Army 
Ranger School, which ultimately ended in a request for help in training a platoon in 
Nigeria, with the sole purpose in mind of combatting Boko Haram (AAFonline 2014). The 
training was supposed to be divided up into three phases, where two of these phases had 
already taken place, when the U.S. cancelled the third and last phase, stating that the 
cancellation was caused by a request from the Nigerian Government (Al Bawaba 2014 b). 
Nigerian National Agency’s spokesman Mike Omeri stated “Nigeria and the US have 
strong military bilateral relations for a long time. The training the US is talking about is in three 
phases which the first and the second phases have been completed and concluded.” We are left with 
the third phase which requires provision of some kind of equipment” (BBC 2014), leaving us to 
believe that provision of weapons is not happening. 
The United States has laws, stating who it may or may not provide weapons to, 
based on the countries’ human rights records. The U.S. has stated that Nigeria is not one of 
those countries who they can provide weapons to, as its records are simply not good 
enough (Tukur 2014).
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Nigeria’s decision to completely cancel the training, due to weapons not being 
provided, begs the question “why”? Why are the weapons so important, that instead of 
receiving the training, which in turn, would likely lead to additional help from the U.S., 
the Nigerian Government would rather decline the help since weapons are not being 
provided? (Al Bawaba 2014 b) The Nigerian military is clearly in need of help in the form 
of training; its tactics are poor when it comes to defence, but also how to act when 
engaging in an attack. A counterattack from the military in February 2015 led to many 
civilians death, as they were caught between Boko Haram militants, and the Nigerian 
army. Their lack of training in protecting the civilians whilst performing an attack, is an 
indefensible shortcoming (Sanborn 2015). 
So why did Nigeria cancel the training? Several reasons are out there, but a senior 
military officer reasoned the cancellation by the fear of America spying on Nigeria (Al 
Bawaba 2014 b). Another source from a strategic office in Nigeria claimed the reason to be 
that Nigeria is in “need of weapons to combat Boko Haram, not training” (Army-Technology 
2014). 
 
4.5 Pending solutions 
Though many different solutions have been offered to the Nigerian Government in the 
removal of Boko Haram, this has still not been achieved yet. As the Government is still 
unsure as to which strategy to take, there are still on-going negotiations to find solutions. 
Boko Haram has recently announced their loyalty towards the group called Islamic 
State (IS, also known as Daesh). IS is mainly located in Syria/Iraq and are fighting against 
any minority groups who do not follow the Muslim way of living i.e. Christians, Yazidis, 
atheists and so on. To combat IS, the American Government has made several statements 
in which they have explained how they will try fighting them and after Boko Haram 
announced they were loyal to Islamic State the US declared a combat against Boko Haram 
as well (Look 2015). It was not a specifically statement saying that they would fight Boko 
Haram but emphasised that the ones that sympathise with IS would be considered 
enemies as well, hence Boko Haram becoming a target. Their strategy and solution which 
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they find helpful in defeating Boko Haram is to improve the local military in a way so they 
can defeat terrorism themselves (Look 2015).  
Nigeria on the other hand does not feel that the U.S. is helping enough. The 
Government maintains that the USA’s equipment in terms of intelligence agencies and 
surveillance, in general, would be a benefit for the country to develop. According to 
Adagpa (2012) and an article from VOAnews (Look 2015) they highlight the importance of 
surveillance and monitoring which is what they feel is lacking among the aid they receive. 
In the same article, Nigeria’s Chief of Defence Intelligence Rear Admiral Gabriel E. Okoi 
explains the importance of having a surveillance system so that they as a Government, 
could be a step ahead of Boko Haram (Look 2015). Furthermore, Nigeria’s former 
president Goodluck Jonathan is expecting the help of US, which he has expressed on 
several occasions (Al Jazeera 2015). The help he seeks, after being reluctant in the start, has 
not been provided which has made the relationship between USA and Nigeria tensed. 
Despite the fact that Jonathan seeks military aid from other countries, he himself cancelled 
a helping military training program from USA (Al Bawaba 2014). 
According to Human Rights Watch (2015) the security forces of Nigeria have been a 
part of extrajudicial killings, torture and arbitrary arrests instead of making sure that the 
civilian’s security is in order. This has been one of the foremost reasons for the U.S. 
deciding not to cooperate in the providing of aid.  
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 5.  Implementation of the Political Theory of Foreign Aid 
In the first sub-question we have focused on the aid provided to Nigeria, as well as 
the Nigerian Government’s response to this.  Despite the Nigerian Government several 
times having asked for help, when aid has been provided, the Government has often 
rejected the aid, on the grounds of it being the wrong kind of aid. Nigeria is seeking help 
mostly in the financial sense, so as to be able to purchase more weapons, drones, and the 
like. The aid that has been provided to them is deployment of AU troops, military 
training, and possible new military strategies. 
The Nigerian Government seems to be quite narrow-minded in terms of accepting 
help, and seems to dismiss outside help as soon as the help is not what the Government 
had in mind. The prospective of this continuity of rejection of help, can prove to be a 
humongous loss for Nigeria, as its reluctance to accept might end in Boko Haram gaining 
even more power, and eventually also spreading to the South of Nigeria.  
This is demonstrated clearly through the case of the US providing military training 
to the Nigerian military.  A 3-phase training programme was supposed to be completed, 
but after only completing the two initial phases of the training, the Nigerian Government 
cancelled the last phase, seeing as it had not been supplied with any weapons. Therefore, 
it would seem that this training regime was of no use. Nigerian Government has several 
times explained it is weapons they need, leading us to believe that they believe their 
training of soldiers is sufficient. Whereas the aid it has been provided show us that the US, 
UK, France etc. believe that training the military is more important, than simply providing 
Nigeria with guns. 
Sana (n.d) argues that one reason for providing foreign aid is the possible threat of 
national security. This makes it clear why the U.S. has got itself involved in the combatting 
of Boko Haram, as their recent increase of members, and escalation of attacks, pose an 
international threat, rather than a regional or domestic one. 
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The reason for the U.S. not providing Nigeria with weapons is due to Nigeria’s 
Human Rights records; yet, even if this record had been adequate, it is uncertain as to 
whether or not aid would have been provided in terms of weapons. Nigeria has earlier 
shown that their security of weapons is inadequate, as many of the weapons Boko Haram 
have access to, are stolen from the Nigerian military, either from military bases, or from 
fights where Nigerian soldiers have fled the scene, and as a result, abandoned their guns 
and vehicles.   
Morgenthau (1962) explains in his Political Theory of Foreign Aid, that foreign aid 
can be provided for different reasons, such as simply supporting countries in need of it. 
However it can also be given as a bribe, meaning that in order for a country to receive the 
aid, it has to give up something else. This could perhaps be one of the reasons why the 
Government fear accepting the help, as their Oil Industry seems to be quite thriving. There 
is no clear answer to whether this is a correct assumption, or if their reluctance to accept 
help stems from a bad infrastructure. 
There is an apparent mistrust between the US and Nigeria, and this was only 
enhanced when Nigeria delayed the help provided by the US in the case of The Chibok 
Girls. Instead of accepting help, Nigerian Government immediately hesitated, for reasons 
unbeknownst to the public. One can assume that the reason for the delayed response 
could be the Nigerian Government’s fear of losing their independence. It has earlier been 
stated in this project that the Government fears too much outside involvement, seeing as 
they feel threatened that the U.S. or the UK might impose on their sovereignty. 
Additionally, since Nigeria’s economy is the most thriving in all of Africa, their political 
position is at stake, if they cannot resolve their own problems.  
This constant delay or rejection of aid puts Nigeria in a bad position, as outside 
sources of help need to feel assured that the resources they are providing are going to an 
acceptable cause. When mistrust is created, it begs the question of whether the aid 
provided is used for its intended cause. Sana (n.d.) argues that removing an international 
threat is an important factor for a country to provide aid, thus if mistrust exists, there 
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might be reason to discontinue aid. If Nigeria does not show any improvement of 
removing Boko Haram, it runs the risk of losing foreign aid, as a means of support.  
 6. Equipment of the Nigerian military  
 
The second sub-question seeks to answer whether the Nigerian military is equipped to 
combat Boko Haram. The chapter starts out with giving a brief background on the history 
of Nigeria under the British rule. The chapter then explains the operating system in 
Nigeria (presidential) and the three branches it contains (executive, legislature, judicial). It 
also makes sense to explain the Nigerian military system, which this chapter does in the 
following section. Also, this chapter looks at how other defence agencies, such as the DIA, 
influence the military. 
When looking at whether the Nigerian military is equipped enough, it is important 
to look at the resources available for the military. Hence, this chapter examines the 
resources available, such as the military budget and facilities (housing, training ground, 
equipment etc.). How these resources are being used is also important to examine.  Also, 
this chapter looks at the Nigerian military's strategies and concludes that the military has 
developed and implemented new strategies in order to contain current threats and to 
prepare the military for future national security challenges.  
 
6.1 The body of the Nigerian Government 
In 1960, the British rule of Nigeria ended, making Nigeria a member of the 
Commonwealth Realm. Though, this membership only lasted 3 years, when the British 
introduced, and enforced, federalism. In 1963, Nigeria became a federal republic, and 
though it has been politically independent ever since, only 24 years of these have been 
with civilian rule, while the rest has been military (Nwaorgu 2013:120). In 1999, Nigeria 
ridded themselves of the military rule (China Daily 1999), and has hitherto remained 
under civilian rule. 
Nigeria has 36 different states and one capital territory, wherein the elected 
President and bi-cameral Legislature have their base. Nigeria operates under a 
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Presidential system of Government, and has three branches: The Executive, The Legislature, 
and The Judicial. 
The Executive branch is composed of the President, the Vice-President and the 
Federal Executive Council, at Federal Level. At state level it consists of The Governor, the 
Deputy Governor and the State Executive Council (The Embassy of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 2015). 
The Legislature similarly consists of both a Federal and State level. At the Federal 
level sits 109 members of Senate, and 360 members from the House of Representatives. 
The House of Assembly is the state level of the Legislature. Together the two levels form 
the National Assembly (Ibid.). 
The Judiciary level is the branch that construes the laws and adjudicates. It consists 
of: The Supreme Court, The Court of Appeal, The Federal High Court, Magistrate Court, 
Area Court and Customary Court (Ibid.). 
Within the Federal Executive Council exists the Deference Council with Minister 
Alhaji Aliyu Gusay and Mr. Musiliu Obanikoro. 
6.2 The body of the Nigerian Military 
The Nigerian military is built up by rank, and the hierarchy within the military uses the 
NATO ranking codes. The highest rank within the Nigerian military is the General. After 
him is the Lieutenant General, then the Major General, the Brigadier (Colonel), the 
Lieutenant Colonel, the Major, the Captain, the First Lieutenant, Lance Corporal and last 
but not least the Cadets (Hierarchystructure 2013). Each level of ranking has executive 
power of the level of ranking beneath them e.g. the Major has a higher level of executive 
power than the Captain. 
 
The corporation between the Government and the Military 
The Nigerian Government and the Nigerian military are bound to work together by the 
Nigerian Constitution, which states that: 
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“The Federation shall, subject to an Act of the National Assembly made in that behalf, equip and 
maintain the armed forces as may be considered adequate and effective for the purpose of…” 
(Nigeria Law 1999) 
and “The powers of the President as the Commissioner-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the 
Federation shall include power to determine the operational use of the armed forces of the 
Federation.” (Nigeria Law 1999) 
This means that regardless of the ranks within the Nigerian military itself, 
ultimately it is the President of Nigeria that has the final executive power. It also means 
that it is the Government that has to provide the military with the means to be able to fight 
a group such as Boko Haram.                            
6.3 Leadership 
The primary role of an intelligence service is to protect the state against threats to its 
national security (Vitkauskas 1999:8). According to NATO, the mandate of a security 
intelligence service describes the tasks that the agency must carry out as well as providing 
the guiding principles by which the agency conducts its operations. Additionally, an 
overall balance is required in the mandate; broad enough to develop the intelligence 
agency’s capabilities to overcome national security threats and clearly defined limits to 
certify the respect for human rights (Vitkauskas 1999:10). 
 
NIA 
The Nigerian National Intelligence Service (NIA) also has the primary role of protecting its 
state from internal, as well as external, security threats. However, the NIA is only in 
charge of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence acts. In May 2013, the former 
president, Goodluck Jonathan, appointed Ayo Oke as the new Director-General of the 
NIA. Also, President Jonathan appointed E.O. Okafor as Deputy Director-General of 
Operations and Arap A. Yadam as Deputy Director-General of Administration of the NIA 
(Saharareporters 2013). 
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DIA 
The Nigerian Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established in 1986 to assist the 
Nigerian Armed forces and the Ministry of Defence and is under the control of Chief of 
Defence Intelligence, Rear Admiral Ge Okoi (Defence Intelligence Agency n.d.). The main 
objectives of the DIA are to promote Nigeria’s Defence Policy, to develop the military’s 
cooperation with the host nations, and to protect the Nigerian soil and its citizens(Defence 
Intelligence Agency n.d.). 
Even though Nigeria has NIA and DIA at its disposal to ensure national security, 
many sources state the lack of effectiveness in the tasks they are supposed to carry 
out.  According to professor Adagpa (2012), the state has not done enough to combat Boko 
Haram and concludes that one of the reasons why they have not achieved it is due to lack 
of modernisation of the intelligence agencies (Adagpa et. al. 2012). The need for more 
developed agencies is emphasised and Adagpa (2012) is convinced that the solution lies 
with countries such as the U.S., China and EU that already have developed and effective 
intelligence services. Also Western human rights agencies are reporting about the misuse 
of surveillance, which is resulting in torture and destruction of homes in Nigeria 
(encyclopedia.com 2015).  
 
6.4 Governmental Dialogue with Boko Haram 
During the past 10 years, since the attacks of Boko Haram have worsened, several 
attempts of dialogue have been made from the Nigerian Government. Though there are 
several opinions on whether dialogue is actually the correct move, seeing as negotiating 
with a terrorist group should not be seen as a viable solution, several governmental 
agencies and personnel have trying getting in touch with Boko Haram. 
Past leader General Abdulsalami Abubakar and former president Olusegun 
Obasanjo have both tried opening up a dialogue with the terrorist group, but to no avail 
(Uchehara 2014). The present leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, has stated that the 
group has no interest in negotiating with representatives of the Nigerian Government 
(Uchehara 2014). 
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Though several attempts have been made, none has prevailed so far. There are 
speculations though, that some Nigerian leaders and Elitist Nigerians have tried bribing 
Boko Haram, in order to keep the group away from their state, or neighborhood 
(Uchehara 2014). In 2011 a mass arrest of members of Boko Haram occurred, including one 
named Ali Sanda Umar Konduga – a spokesman for the group. Konduga has later in an 
interrogation performed by the SSS (State Security Service) revealed that numerous 
politicians of Nigeria have made financial contributions to Boko Haram (Uchehara 2014). 
This information led to the arrest of Senator Ndume, a member of the, at the time, 
governing party PDP (People’s Democratic Party). 
Former President Goodluck Jonathan has admitted that Nigerian politicians have 
been providing Boko Haram with information, which has led to an infiltration of the SSS, 
and the Nigerian Government (Uchehara 2014; Salaam 2012) 
As dialogue has not seemed as a feasible solution to combat Boko Haram, the 
Nigerian Government has had to find new ways of resolving the issue. One thing the 
Government has done, in order to make the life of the terrorist group’s lives harder, is 
make sure that no safe havens exist for them. There should be no room for members of 
Boko Haram in Nigeria, and in an effort to not create room for them, the Government has 
closed some of its borders with Cameroon and Niger. The states that share these borders 
are all located in the Northeast part of Nigeria, where Boko Haram mainly resides (Salaam 
2012). 
Despite the Government taking this action, it is unsure whether this is strategically 
a good move. Many Northerners have presumably joined Boko Haram, due to the poor 
economy in the North (Zenn 2014). Closing the borders to Cameroon and Niger prevents 
the trade between these countries and Nigeria, resulting in an even worse economy than 
previously. One can wonder if this Governmental move can result in Boko Haram 
growing in members.  
6.5 Military budget  
Since the vigorous escalation of Boko Haram in 2009, the military budget (% of GDP) has 
decreased, rather worryingly. However, the military budget is expected to rise in the near 
 Roskilde University  
 The Bachelor Study Programme in Social Science 
 Project report | 2nd semester | BP 2 
page 41 / 66 
future. In May 2014, the former president, Goodluck Jonathan, signed Nigeria’s budget, of 
which a substantial amount was allocated to the Defence.   
According to the World Bank n.d., the Nigerian Military budget decreased from 
0.9% in 2009 to 0.5% in 2010. The budget slightly increased to 0.6% in 2011 (World Bank 
n.d.), equivalent to $2.1 billion (Defenceweb 2012). Despite this, the military budget is 
expected to grow 1.3% by 2016 (Defenceweb 2012). 
In 2014, the former President, Goodluck Jonathan, signed the annual budget, of 
which 20 percent ($30 billion) was allocated to the Defence sector (Udo 2014). According to 
the Minister of Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the government has in the recent years 
expended an extensive amount on the defence sector, especially on the joint task force and 
special operations against terrorism (Udo 2014). 
Despite spending billions, if not trillions, of dollars, the Nigerian defence industry 
is under-developed. The industry produces a small amount of arms and equipment, which 
is not very desirable on the foreign markets. The defence industry is forced to spend a 
large amount of the budget of the import of arms and equipment and as a result, less is 
spent on research and development. The total military budget not being sufficient enough 
results in low allocation for the purchase of arms, high-technology equipment and 
research and development  Furthermore, the prohibition on foreign direct investment in 
the defence sector acts as a further obstacle (Defenceweb 2012). 
6.6 Military Facilities 
In order to assess whether or not the ill-equippedness of the Nigerian military has played 
a role in its failure to tackle the situation at hand, it makes sense to examine the military’s 
facilities. Our understanding of the term ‘facilities’ allows us to look at the soldiers’ 
barracks, their training grounds and their military bases.    
Perhaps the main way in which the Nigerian Government can maintain the 
wellbeing of its armed forces is through the providing and maintenance of suitable 
accommodation. Yet, since the turn of the century, investigations suggest that many of the 
barracks Nigeria’s soldiers are housed in, are in fact derelict or non-functioning (Daily 
Independent 2014). After visiting many of the nation’s barracks, Nigeria’s former 
 Roskilde University  
 The Bachelor Study Programme in Social Science 
 Project report | 2nd semester | BP 2 
page 42 / 66 
president Olusegun Obansanjo, initiated a series of renovation projects, in an effort to 
ensure all soldiers had both permanent and proper accommodation. 
According to Daily Independent (2014), the improvements on the barracks and 
troop accommodation have been dealt up in the following way: at the Demo Battalion in 
the rural community of Jaji, a number of 1, 2 and 3 bedroom apartments have been built 
for the soldiers and their respective families. Moreover, in the state of Kaduna, the military 
air base 16 apartments, both 3 and 5 bedroom, have been brought up to scratch; the 
buildings which had been abandoned are now inhabited by members of the Nigerian Air 
Force. Likewise, in the city of Minna, located in West-central Nigeria, 72 family 
apartments have also been refurbished, in accordance with the Government’s plans.   
The leader of these projects, Mrs Binta Muaza, highlights the purpose driving these 
major developments within the military sector, stating ‘the Federal Government’s 
commitment [is] promoting the welfare of the armed forces’ (Daily Independent 2014). 
Many of Nigeria’s ground troops have had to move from camp to camp, seeing as several 
of the barracks are either burned out, dilapidated or simply abandoned. Nevertheless, due 
to a lack of governmental funding, these projects are yet to be completed (Daily 
Independent 2014). Furthermore, it would seem that these improvements have come 
rather late on in the battle, thus leading us to believe that the military’s lack of appropriate 
housing must be one of the main causal factors in its unsuccessful ten-year long battle 
with Boko Haram. 
 
6.7 Military equipment 
The following piece of writing will examine the military’s combat capability in relation to 
that of Boko Haram, focusing specifically on how well/poorly equipped the Nigerian 
military is. By doing so, we aim to offer a unique explanation for its categorically 
unsuccessful interference in combating Boko Haram. For the purpose of this text, the term 
‘equipment’ is used to cover forms of physical tools, which the military has at its disposal, 
such as weapons, ammunition, inventory and combat vehicles. 
Though the weapon inventory of the Nigerian military has been calculated to 
exceed 1.2 million - a number far greater than that of Boko Haram - the rebel group has 
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still managed to overcome all efforts the military has made to intervene. (NationMaster 
2014). The military of Nigeria is not capable of doing any great defensive operations. Some 
factors that affect the military negatively is corruption, lack of resources and poor 
conditions in general that leads to the reduced results. Yet, in fact the military of Nigeria in 
comparison with many African countries holds a very big amount of troops 60.000 and 
several battalions at its disposal (Global Security 2014) and actually the page provides a 
whole list of available equipment of the military. This would suggest that, rather than the 
number of weapons in possession being the deciding factor in whether or not the military 
or Boko Haram is more powerful, it is actually the type of weapon that plays the greatest 
role. Thus, it must be assumed that both parties possess different sets of weapons. 
According to E-reporter (2014), there have been several complaints from within the 
military sector that the weapons the soldiers are equipped with are essentially ‘obsolete’ in 
comparison to their enemies who possess much more ‘sophisticated weapons.’ Many of 
the insurgents are armed with sub-machine guns, whereas the majority of the military’s 
troops only have access to rifles or other less damage-inflicting arms. Moreover, the 
former US ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell, has described how, after being sent out 
into a shootout, often many of the troops are forced to surrender and flee, since they are 
equipped with just ’30 rounds of ammunition’ (foxnews 2015). This leads us to the 
conclusion that Boko Haram is better equipped than the Nigerian military in terms of 
weaponry. 
Nigeria’s army General, Kenneth Tobiah Minimah, recently made the following 
comment: “We would have crushed those criminals within three months. Give us 30 
powerful aircraft and see us bringing the terrorists to their knees. We have all that is 
needed to overcome them but the mobility.” (Ejiofor 2014) Referring to Boko Haram, 
Kenneth succinctly reveals how the military’s Achilles heel is its lack of mobility; due to 
Boko Haram troops being widely dispersed throughout several states in Northern Nigeria, 
the military is simply struggling to keep up. Though many thousands of troops have been 
deployed in the terror-stricken states, it would seem that Boko Haram is always one step 
ahead. Hathorn and Abbott (2015), clarify how Boko Haram has ‘a large number of pickup 
trucks’ in its possession, which have subsequently been modified in order to make it 
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possible for machine guns to be mounted on them. Naturally, Nigerian soldiers who are 
sent out on foot, stand very little chance in surviving such a shootout. Additionally, they 
have examined published footage of the terror group, which has been circulating the 
Internet and have noticed that the group has also been able to acquire both tanks and 
armoured personnel carriers (Walker 2012). As a result of poorly secured military bases, 
many of the weapons and combat vehicles Boko Haram make use of have been seized 
from the Nigerian military. For example, in January 2015 in the state of Baga, Boko Haram 
fighters managed to steal both combat vehicles and army tanks, after carrying out an 
organised attack on the local military base (Rogo 2015). 
After analysing carefully the breakdown of the military’s equipment, it is apparent 
how the military is in fact less sophisticatedly equipped than Boko Haram. Admittedly, a 
proportion of the weaponry owned by Boko Haram is stolen, once belonging to the 
military, however, many of the more dangerous arms such as mortar bombs and grenades, 
are believed to have been bought on the black market (Hathorn, S., & Abbott, C 2015:1). 
The emergence of Boko Haram has laid bare the powerlessness of what was arguably once 
was sub-Saharan Africa’s most formidable army.   
Another reason for why the military is not working ideal has been the power shift 
changing from military generals to elected politicians. The history of Nigeria is known for 
many military coups and regimes and under these regimes the military strength has been 
at the highest. However, when in 1999 Nigeria decided to restore their democracy and be 
more democratic they inhibited the military in order to give politicians more power. A 
shift in mentality from Nigeria being a military run state to a democratic state has led to 
the politicians having more influence in how the country is run. As a result of this, the 
Government has enjoyed an increase in economic resources, whereas the military has 
received less (Stein 2015). The article also emphasises the lack of resources within 
manpower, economic contribution and weaponry (Stein 2015). 
6.8 Military strategies 
The Nigerian Government has been under extreme struggle and pressure from both 
regional and international community. Domestic media has labelled Nigeria a failed State 
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due to its ability to act on the insurgencies it has been experiencing. Former President 
Goodluck Jonathan has repeatedly discussed possible strategies concerning how to 
combat the  terrorist group, however, scholars are still doubtful as to whether or not an 
actual solution will come to fruition.  
In 2014 the former President said: “I am determined to protect our democracy, our 
national unity and our political stability, by waging a total war against terrorism […] I 
assure you … that these thugs will be driven away. It will not happen overnight, but we 
will spare no effort to achieve this goal” (Brown 2014) In addition, he assured the people 
that with “the support of Nigerians, our neighbors and the international community, we 
will reinforce our defense, free our girls and rid Nigeria of terrorists.” (Brown 2014). 
In regards to Jonathan’s announcement about his long-term strategy to combat 
Boko Haram, an assistant professor of Pacific Lutheran University, Ami Shah, commented 
on his military strategy (Brown 2014), saying that the President is “throwing everything 
out there and I don’t know if he has an actual strategy of what this looks like”. Another 
professor at the Mary Baldwin College at the Political Science department, Cara Jones, told 
in an interview with ThinkProgress, that “It’s a very tense time and really unclear where 
it’s all going to end up” (Ibid). Since the incident with the missing girls back in 2014, 
Jonathan’s strategies have brought many to question his methods and approaches. One of 
the many methods was conducted in primo 2014. The President fired the top military 
chiefs, due to his new approaches to combating Boko Haram. It occurs as a new form of 
strategy to have new leaders. Over the past few years, President Goodluck Jonathan has 
tried to reach his goals for his country by recapturing parts of Nigeria. The Nigerian 
Military has essentially occupied three states in northern Nigeria, however the insurgent 
violence continues. Political consultant, Fabian Ihekweme, commented on the renewed 
military strategy saying it is very clear that the former  President is seeking different 
approaches and new strategies (Murdock 2014). 
Sani Usman, a spokesman for the Nigerian Army, stated that the troops provided 
by the African Union have recaptured  locals members from Boko Haram in North Eastern 
part of Nigeria (Abdulmalik 2015). 
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Mafa and Marte, areas of Borno State, were recaptured  during the operations, and 
a large amount of ammunition and anti aircraft guns belonging to Boko Haram were 
found. The troops are mobbing the recovered territories and “… effort is ongoing to 
recover more grounds from the fleeing terrorists.” (Abdulmalik 2015). Strategically, by 
recapturing Marte and Mafa’s Local Government Areas in Borno state, as well as holding 
fort in Dikwa, more secure national routes from Chad, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic and Nigeria have been secured (Ikeke 2014). 
The spokesman for the Nigerian Army stresses how well and positive the 
developments of the security has been improved. The Nigerian military retook the 
Headquarter of Madagli LGA of Adamawa State, including Tetebah, Kamla, Bumsa, 
Shikah and Fikayel. The intensive operation from the military has recovered the biggest 
towns and communities from Boko Haram, and according to the Nigerian Army, if the 
provision and help from the international community and socio-economic trade continues, 
the Nigerian Government will succeed in combating Boko Haram (Ikeke 2014). 
The Nigerian military strategy of destroying Boko Haram has been questionable for 
many. Among others, the director of Policy and Legal Advocacy, Clement Nwankwo, said 
that due to Jonathan’s promised destruction of the terrorist group and his goals towards a 
greater democracy, he has not been capable of keeping his promises: “Look, you’ve been 
so incompetent we don’t think the country will survive much more with you.  So you need 
to give up on your ambition” (Murdock 2014). The fundamental military strategy is based 
on securing urban places, mostly in Nigeria. In defence, the Chief of Army Staff, Kenneth 
Minimah, the military has “developed and implemented new strategies not only to 
contain current threats but also to better prepare us to combat future security challenges“ 
(Ikeke 2014). He further explains that there will occur difficulties and challenges, but the 
military and its soldiers are surmountable with determination. Minimah stresses the duty 
of the military namely to stay loyal to the Nigerian community and to its citizens. The 
Military wants to assure the people of Nigeria all form of security forces to be applied; also 
with the cooperation between the ministries and bodies of the Government, both peace 
and law will be imposed (Ikeke 2014). 
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 7. Implementation of the Change Model  
The following section will be comprised of a general examination of our chosen indicators 
with regards to our second sub-question, in which our chosen theory ‘The Change Model’ 
will be applied. All gathered data we consider to be relevant in assessing the functionality 
of the Nigerian military, will be analysed in order for us to be in a position to draw a 
rational conclusion.  
The main question we seek to answer is, why is the Nigerian military still unable to 
successfully defeat Boko Haram, seeing as it has a both a greater weapons inventory and 
greater number of ground troops. In accordance with the Change Model, we interpret the 
term ‘management’ to be the Nigerian Government and the term ‘employees’ as the 
military. Though the military is a branch of the Government, it is essentially the political 
fragment of the Government, which is responsible for giving the military orders and 
providing them with the means to perform the orders.    
7.1 Leadership 
By using the Change Model to construct our analysis, we have chosen to connect each 
indicator to the most relevant step in the Change Model. This will result in a more detailed 
and sufficient analysis of each indicator. Additionally, this will give us more adequate 
conclusions. 
According to our broad findings, the Nigerian military has shown signs of 
weakness in regards to combating its enemy, Boko Haram. One of the most influential 
indicators for how the Nigerian military is acting towards the insurgent group is, 
leadership. As demonstrated in our previous chapter, empirical data has shown that the 
Nigerian military is lacking leadership. The military has not yet shown any consistency in 
either its strategy or its policy to combat Boko Haram. Not only is the military missing a 
coherent guidance but also a comprehensible strategy (Obasi 2015; Adagpa 2012). 
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According to Kotter (1996) and the Change Model, by establishing a sense of 
urgency among leaders, it will raise the determination level. In relation to the first step of 
the Change Model, by creating a sense of insistence, and getting a full understanding of 
the current situation of the military, the leaders will have a better and a more improved 
functional strategic plan to control both the troops and the current situation. According to 
Blanchard (2015), the Nigerian Government is facing trouble in regards to their tactics and 
procedures. Not only has the leader’s training and communication failed, but the Nigerian 
military has not been provided with consistent management, nor is it able to understand 
the importance of the situation. However, by creating the first step of the model, another 
key factor can appear if the necessary adjustment has been implemented; coalition (Kotter 
1996). Kotter (1996) suggests that by creating a form of coalition between leaders, it will 
establish a strong commitment, which will lead to a more effective leadership.  
Nevertheless, in order to have a strong coalition, which Kotter (1996) describes as 
position power, the military is required to ensure a better expertise in the decision making 
process. In addition to this, Kotter (1996) suggests that by having credibility as a leader, 
the entire process will then be much easier to cope with. According to Uchehara (2014), 
there has been several attempts to negotiate and communicate with Boko Haram, although 
the group has made it clear that it has no interest whatsoever in negotiating with the 
Nigerian Government. It can be argued that negotiation with terrorists is strategically 
unwise as there are several factors into it; the terrorists will legitimise their actions, other 
countries will be reluctant to provide future aid and the government will lose its 
credibility. This can fall under the category of corruption. Consequently, this can have a 
negative effect on the credibility of the leading force of the military. By establishing these 
four elements, the Nigerian Military and its troops will be ensured with good credibility to 
their leaders and can result in positive outcome: creating a vision and reaching their goals 
(Obasi 2015). 
Lastly, Kotter (1996) proposes that in order to establish the most optimal leadership, 
one must implement a clear vision of one’s goals. In our case, the Nigerian military is 
lacking motivation and vision. Throughout the empirical data and findings regarding 
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military strategies, it has not yet been discussed how the military is planning to combat 
Boko Haram on a more detailed level. Sambo Dasuki, Nigeria’s national security advisor 
stated: “Unfortunately, we have a lot of cowards… people who use every excuse in this 
world not to fight” (Obasi 2015). This statement is a clear indication of how the motivation 
of fighting for the country has been affected (Obasi 2015). The ambition behind 
cooperating and communicating is very poor. In this case, according to Kotter himself 
(1996), it is important to motivate the employees (troops) by creating a clear vision. By 
knowing what the goals are, and how to get there, it will make the crossover easier. 
Meaning that if the Nigerian military leaders have a clear vision about the future goals, the 
troops will have more credibility in the strategy of combating Boko Haram. 
However, as the fourth step in the Change Model, Kotter (1996) suggests, in order 
to implement all four steps, it is necessary to communicate the vision (Kotter 1996). The 
Nigerian military is lacking a clear strategy, ergo a clear vision, which will be later 
discussed in this chapter. By using communication as a leadership strategy, the process of 
implementing visions and motivation will be more accessible and more feasible. 
On the other hand, according to the Chief of Army Staff, Kenneth Minimah, the 
Nigerian military are surmountable with determination. He stresses how important it is to 
have loyalty to the nation and its citizens. The situation of combating Boko Haram has 
caused many unforseen challenges (Ikeke 2014). Nevertheless, Minimah suggests that by 
implementing and developing new strategies, it will assist the Nigerian troops and assure 
a strong security force for the Nigerian military. It is clear that representatives of the 
Nigerian Government are clear about the fact that the military is lacking a new strategy, 
but in order to create a new strategy, it is, according to Kotter (1996), important to 
establish communication. 
Seeing leadership as an influential indicator as an equipment to the military, it is 
clear that the Nigerian military is lacking both coalition and communications. There is a 
diversity in terms of whether the Nigerian military is lacking leadership or not. However, 
by basing our research findings on empirical data from African scholars, professors and 
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Security Advisors, it is evident that the military is lacking a sense of leadership. By 
implementing the Change Model, it has shown that the military is missing numerous of 
elements from the model. Importantly, without having an established coalition and 
communication between leaders and troops, the Nigerian military will end up without a 
constant and stable management of the military, which can lead to fatal results. 
7.2 Budget 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the Nigerian Military Budget in order to 
find out how it has disadvantaged Nigeria’s troops.  However, unlike the previous 
analysis section, this segment will not directly relate the indicator, Budget, to “The Change 
Model”. However, it can be argued that the budget is a relevant key factor for creating and 
acting a new vision - as is the sole purpose of the model.  
The lack of appropriate sources and information about the Budget hinders us in 
examining how the future budget strategy will corporate with the model. This is due to 
the fact that the Nigerian Government does not have a further and detailed plan or vision 
available in any sources we could find regarding the military budget.  
According to our chapter about budget, there has been a decrease in the military 
allowance. If the Boko Haram’s actions continue in the present manner, or even increase, 
the group's’ influence and power will increase in Nigeria. Instead of using the money to 
develop the military, they will be forced to maintain it, in turn creating a vicious circle not 
allowing the military to grow as an organisation. Moreover, as previously mentioned, 
former president Goodluck Jonathan has allocated a large fraction of the Government 
budget to the military. This could be a possible sign that the risk of Boko Haram is being 
taken seriously by the Government. Despite this, very little has actually been achieved in 
regards to defeating the group.  
It is obvious that when Boko Haram is present and causing damages, the 
Government should realise the problem and allocate the money in regards to the fight 
against them as they have done. Despite this, it seems as if the size of the problem is not 
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recognized by the Government seeing as the group is continuously doing damage and the 
budget they have in disposal do not create any solutions. This opens up two options; 
either the military should be given more money to create a bigger army or buy artillery 
etc., or other factors that can have an effect on the bad results should be taken into 
considerations and improved. These factors could, inter alia, be leadership, resources or 
facilities. 
As mentioned  throughout the project, the main reason for why the Government 
has been unsuccessful is due to corruption, our ultimate cause. So even if more money was 
allocated to the military, there is no guarantee that they would spend the money in a way 
that would be advantageous to the soldiers. 
In general, the defence sector of the Nigerian Government is not capable of 
producing any desirable equipment, which of course has a negative effect on the budget 
but also on the economy of the country. They do not produce equipment or provide any 
training that can improve the military as a unit. This situation results in difficulties 
regarding development for the military as an organisation, and the budget specifically. 
Despite Jonathan’s efforts to ensure a sufficient budget for the military, investments in 
modernised weapons are still not prioritised highly enough.  
All these weaknesses are factors that create unsuccessful results, which the military 
is facing. In addition to this, it would seem that the military’s internal decision-making has 
been unable to decide how the budget should be allotted.  
7.3 Equipment  
Step 3 ‘Create a vision’ accounts for the main goal of the Nigerian military; namely, 
to eliminate Boko Haram and ensure national safety. The way in which the Government’s 
‘vision’ has been implemented is through its deployment of military troops throughout 
the country. However, even though this step has been followed, the Government’s 
apparent lack of urgency has meant that the armour and weapons the troops have been 
equipped with have been of too poor a quality. The weapons the ground soldiers are 
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provided with must be more sophisticated than those Boko Haram possess, if Nigeria’s 
military is to be successful. The very fact that Boko Haram's insurgency has been going on, 
undisturbed, for more than 10 years, could suggest that the soldiers have had to make do 
with the same standard level of weaponry since the outbreak of the problem. Meanwhile, 
by stealing weapons and illegally acquiring them through other terror groups, Boko 
Haram has continued to gain in strength.   
Moving on to step 5, ‘the implementation of the vision’, it is apparent how this 
stage in the process is where the military has failed most miserably. An additional reason 
as to why the military has been in vain in the fight against Boko Haram, despite its efforts 
being very pro-active, is its lack of suitable training. As a result, many of its tanks and 
combat vehicles have been stolen by Boko Haram, seeing as the soldiers have not been 
taught about the importance of security (Hathorn, S., & Abbott, C 2015:1). The military’s 
inability to manage its equipment has consequently benefitted the enemy by providing 
them with more. If this problem is to be overcome, the Government must spend more 
money on, not only upgrading the military’s equipment, but also on barrack security. It 
would make sense not only to focus on attack strategies, but also defence strategies, seeing 
as this would ensure the military budget is not wasted on equipment which is at risk of 
being stolen.  
In addition to this, step 6 of ‘The Change Model’ seems to fit in appropriately with 
the way in which the military has attempted to tackle the problem. Short-term wins have 
been achieved by the military in a sense that several villages and towns in the Northern 
states of Nigeria have been recaptured by the military, despite its lack of proper 
equipment. Therefore, seeing as the soldiers do have the ability to win against the enemy, 
albeit on a local scale, then the lack of equipment would seem to be one of the major 
setbacks, preventing the military from victory on a national scale. It could be argued that 
these mini wins may, in turn, lead to the conquering of Boko Haram, however, it is also 
important to remember that the rebel group is continually growing in strength. Thus, if 
the military does not improve its levels of equipment, it is likely that Boko Haram's grasp 
on the country will greaten.     
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In conclusion, the final step of the model, step 8, accounts for why the original 
vision must be continually improved upon, in order to ensure that it remains relevant to 
its respective purpose. In this case, in regards to the equipment the Nigerian military has 
available, as a result of the Government’s budget allocation, it must re equip its troops 
with modernised weapons, vehicles and armour. A noticeable enhancement to the military 
equipment is required in order to enable Nigeria to defeat Boko Haram.   
7.4 Strategy  
It is discussed that the Nigerian Government’s strategies to combat Boko Haram are 
dependable. Modern day scholars seem to agree that the Nigerian Government 
(“management” according to the model) is in need of new strategies. It can thus be 
argued, that the Nigerian Government can benefit from this 8-step model, which will be 
discussed in the following paragraph.     
In essence, the entire 8-step program is geared towards the creation and carrying 
out of new strategies. The 5th step of the model, in which the importance of empowering 
others to act on the vision is emphasised, fits in most appropriately with the Nigerian 
Government’s way of managing the problem at hand. Once the first four steps of the 
model are completed, the management needs to train the employees (troops) as to how to 
act out the new strategy. This will provide the military with a sense of empowerment and 
responsibility. Once the military is trained to implement the new strategy the troops 
should be put into practice. Though carrying out the new strategy might be demanding,  
in terms of finances and military equipment, it is of vital importance that it is carried out 
as otherwise the military will lose the ambition and faith in the new strategy. The success 
of the new strategy will further motivate the military and will provide them with a sense 
of accomplishment.  
Also, it can be argued that for the new strategy to succeed it is crucial that the steps 
are followed entirely. However, this is one of the challenges, which the Nigerian 
Government may face when attempting to implement the new strategy. We have 
consistently witnessed that the Nigerian Government has lacked in providing what they 
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pledge. This, it can be discussed, will harm the strategy, which the Nigerian Government 
at this point is in least need of. 
Likewise, the risk of the formation of this coalition in creating new strategies being 
overruled by outside opposition is very likely, due to the high level of corruption in 
Nigeria. If the decision making body is interrupted by outside forces, the chances of a new 
strategy being created are low. 
The continuous improvement and development of the strategy is also very 
important, as to achieve the final goals. However, as discussed in the previous chapters, in 
order for the strategy to be developed and improved, the Government needs to provide 
certain resources. Nonetheless, the Nigerian Government is incapable of providing 
sufficient resources, especially in terms of military equipment and training. It can be 
argued that for a strategy to improve and develop, it needs to be carried out. The 
achievements will then help the strategy to be improved and developed. As mentioned 
earlier, the military will lose faith if there are no short-term wins. So, if the Nigerian 
Government is not able to provide resources, the strategy will not be carried out and the 
military will eventually lose faith and the strategy will no longer improve nor develop. 
This fits perfectly in line with the 6th step of the model - planning and creating short-term 
wins.  
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 8. Conclusion 
 
After scrutinising our research question, ‘Why has the Nigerian military been unsuccessful 
in combating Boko Haram,’ we are now in a position to draw relevant conclusions. The 
analysis of our indicators, as well application of our chosen theories, the Change model 
and the Political Theory of Foreign Aid, have provided us with a more profound 
understanding of our problem area.  
Seeing as we conceptualise political interference as being equal to aid, we have 
learned the importance of, not only the use of aid in terms of political negotiation, but also 
how the rejection of aid can disadvantage a military. Based on our findings, it is apparent 
that the Nigerian military has been unable to carry out its job, as a result of poor internal 
decision making within the Government. One of the prominent reasons for why Boko 
Haram, still to this day, is plaguing Nigeria, is a direct result of the Government’s rejection 
of international aid. The majority of the aid which has been offered to the Nigerian 
Government has been in the form of training, strategical advice and surveillance. 
Nevertheless, the Government has shunned this, since it is more interested in receiving aid 
in terms of advanced weaponry and drones. As a result, the military has been unable to 
effectively eradicate Boko Haram’s militants from Nigerian territory. Furthermore, it 
exacerbates the mistrust between the countries providing aid, and Nigeria. In accordance 
with The Political Theory of Foreign Aid, it is plain to see that, a Government which 
perceives international aid to be insufficient for its armed forces, is in reality doing its 
nation a disservice. Seeing as the main purpose of giving foreign aid is to support the 
receiving country, thereby reinforcing the military, it is obvious that the rejection of this 
aid by the Nigerian Government has put the country at a disadvantage.  
In addition to this, our second sub-question has also been instrumental in 
unearthing the fundamental reasons for why the Nigerian military’s efforts have, on the 
whole, been fruitless. Taking our point of departure in our definition of equipment, that is, 
a military’s leadership, strategies, budget and weaponry, we understand how Boko 
Haram has not been defeated yet, as a result of the military's lack hereof.     
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According to Kotter (1996) and his Change Model, it is essential for a military force 
to have these key factors, in order to create an efficient strategy. It can be concluded that 
one of the most influential factors for creating such a strategy is the need of a well function 
military leadership. Based on our analysis, the Nigerian Government has failed to show 
any clear structure in how it plans to deal with Boko Haram, making it challenging for the 
military to convey a distinct strategy to its troops. Not only has a decrease in troop morale 
caused the military to feel insecure as to how to tackle the situation, but the lack of 
appropriate leadership has also meant that the troops have no real motivation to drive 
them towards their goal. This has been evident through the many reports of troops 
abandoning their weapons in the midst of clashes with its enemy.  
Likewise, a lack of modern weaponry, proper barrack security and efficient 
financial management has physically prevented the military from being able to fulfil its 
duties as an armed force. Seeing as the military has not created improvements in respect to 
these factors, it is unlikely that its soldiers will be able to conquer Boko Haram in the near 
future. More sophisticated weaponry is fundamental in the fight for victory. It would 
seem that the one plausible solution to this problem would be a change in the 
management of the budget. In order for Boko Haram to be eliminated, a greater allocation 
of money must be invested in the upkeep of the military barracks and ammunition.  
In accordance with the assumption made in our research question, the Nigerian 
Military has been categorically unsuccessful in combating Boko Haram, owing to the 
respective factors: rejection of aid, poor leadership, underdeveloped strategies, poor 
allocation of budget, and lack of proper equipment. Our theories, combined with our 
research, have shown that a better use of these elements would prove helpful for the 
military in the ongoing battle against Boko Haram. In regards to our analysis chapter, if 
the military were to pay more attention to the redevelopment of the aforementioned 
factors, it would be in better stead to succeed in the removal of Boko Haram. 
While writing this project, quite a few substantial political changes have occurred in 
Nigeria. A new president has been elected, and Goodluck Jonathan is no longer running 
the country. Instead, the new President is now a former Major General, by the name of 
Muhammadu Buhari. Buhari has several times criticised Jonathan’s ways of running 
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things, and believes a Government filled with corruption is no way to lead a country. One 
can hope that with both this new mentality taken on by the Government and a leader with 
a military background, the likelihood for the military being successful in defeating Boko 
Haram will greaten. 
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